Towards an adequate representation of illocutionary force in FG
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0. Introduction.

Except for the suggestion of De Jong (1980), the organisation of grammar such as it is conceived in Functional Grammar (hereafter FG) does not contain a specification of the Illocutionary Force associated with linguistic utterances. We have shown elsewhere (Moutaouakil to appear) the need for a grammar (above all when it is a pragmatically orientated grammar such as FG) to provide a level of representation for the illocutionary force of utterances. We have pointed out, notably, the interaction between the illocutionary force of an utterance and the pragmatic functions (particularly that of Focus) which are associated with it. Our aim in this article is to propose a mode of representation for the illocutionary force which seems to us to be compatible with the principles of FG and the organisation of grammar which it proposes.

In section 1 we review the essential characteristics of the notions 'speech act' and 'implicature' in the philosophy of ordinary language. Section 2 will consist of an explanation of the solutions proposed in linguistics relating to the problem of representation of illocutionary force, especially those proposed within the framework of the performative hypothesis and by De Jong within FG. In section 3 we examine successively the two preceding solutions and then suggest a solution which seems to us to satisfy two essential requirements, to take account in the most adequate way of the illocutionary force of linguistic utterances and to fulfil the methodological constraints imposed on grammar within the theory of FG.

1. Illocutionary force in ordinary language philosophy.

1.1. The notion 'speech act'.

Following the neutralisation by Austin of the 'constative vs performative dichotomy' to the advantage of a theory of speech acts, several suggestions have been made within the framework of ordinary language philosophy to take account of the notion 'speech act'. Searle (1969) considers the production of a linguistic utterance to be the performance concomitant with four speech acts. The *utterance act*, the *propositional act*, the *illocutionary act*, and the *perlocutionary act*. Stressing the importance of the propositional act and the illocutionary act Searl suggests the representation of the semantic potential of the linguistic utterance by formula (1) as follows:

1

(1)   F(p)

where F and P indicate respectively the illocutionary force and the proposi-
tional content of the phrase. Therefore, according to (1), the illocutionary
force associated with the propositional content of (2), (3), and (4) has,
respectively, the force of an assertion, that of a question, and that of a
promise.

(2)   Zāra   Zaydun   ᶜAmran l-bāriḥata
        3Sg-visited Zayd-Nom   Amr-Acc yesterday-Acc
        'Zayd visited Amr yesterday.'

(3) a. ?a masā?an   rajaᶜa   Zaydun
        Q evening-Acc 3Sg-returned Zayd-Nom
        'Did Zayd return in the evening?'

     b. hal sāᶜada   Zaydun   Ḥālidan
        Q   3Sg-helped Zayd-Nom Halid-Acc
        'Did Zayd help Halid?'

(4)   ?aᶜiduka   ?annanī   sa?azūruka
        1Sg-promise 1SgAcc-that Fut-1Sg-visit-2Sg
        'I promise to visit you.'

The illocutionary force associated with the propositional content of a phrase
is expressed by an Indicator of Illocutionary Force (IIF hereafter), which may
be a special intonational contour, a morpheme, or the verb of the matrix
clause. Accordingly, the illocutionary force of the question in (3a-b) and that
of the promise in (4) are expressed respectively by the two interrogative
morphemes a and hal and by the verb of the matrix clause ?aᶜiduka 'promise'.

1.2. Direct speech act vs indirect speech act: implicature.

One of the properties of natural languages is that the illocutionary force
associated with a linguistic utterance performed in certain classes of context
may be different from that of the IIF. Let us consider the utterances (5a-b)
and (6a-b):

(5) a. ?a Zaydan   tantaqidu
        Q Zayd-Acc 2Sg-criticise
        'Are you critisising Zayd?'

     b. ?a ?aḫāka   tasubbu
        Q brother-Acc-your 2Sg-insult
        'Are you insulting your brother?'

2

(6) a. hal tastaṭīᶜu   ?an tusāᶜidanī
         Q   2Sg-be-able that 2Sg-help-1SgAcc
         'Can you help me?'

     b. hal tastaṭiᶜu   ?an tuṣāḥibanī
         Q   2Sg-be-able that 2Sg-accompany-1SgAcc
         'Can you accompany me?'

The illocutionary force associated with (5a-b) and (6a-b) is, in principle (as indicated by the interrogative morphemes *?a* and *hal*, that of a question. Now in certain contexts these two pairs of sentences are understood as having respectively the illocutionary force of a reproach and that of a request.

The phenomenon of a sentence having an illocutionary force other than that which corresponds to its syntactic form has been dealt with, as is well known, within ordinary language philosophy under the names 'implicature' (Grice 1975) and 'indirect speech act' (Searle 1975).

In order to take account of the phenomenon of 'implicature', Grice proposes a certain number of rules known as 'maxims' subsumed by the principle known as the 'cooperative principle' capable of governing all conversational exchanges. Proceeding from these maxims, Grice defines 'implicature' as being produced by the intentional violation of one or other of these maxims. Thus, to take an example, (7b) in the following dialogue conversationally implies (7c), by virtue of the violation of the maxim of relevance:'

(7) a. hal Zaydun   luġawiyyun   mumtāzun
         Q   Zayd-Nom linguist-Nom excellent-Nom
         'Is Zayd an excellent linguist?'

     b. Zaydun   riyāḍiyyun   mumtāzun
         Zayd-Nom sportsman-Nom excellent-Nom
         'Zayd is an excellent sportsman.'

     c. laysa   Zaydun   luġawiyyan   mumtāzan
         Neg-3Sg-be Zayd-Nom linguist-Acc excellent-Acc
         'Zayd is not an excellent linguist'.

Regarding the illocutionary force associated with linguistic utterances, Searle draws a distinction between the 'simple cases', where the utterance has the illocutionary force which corresponds to its syntactic form, and the 'complex cases', where the utterance possesses in addition to its literal illocutionary force a non-literal or contextual illocutionary force. Thus (8b) in the following dialogue performs, in addition to the literal or direct act (the assertion that an article must be written), the non-literal or indirect act of refusal expressed in (8c):

(8) a. hal tusāḥibunī   ?ilā l-masraḥi   hāḏā l-masā?a
       Q   2Sg-accompany-1Sg to   the-theatre-Gen this evening-Acc
       'Will you accompany me to the theatre this evening?'

    b. sa?aktubu   maqālatan   hāḏā l-masā?a
       Fut-1Sg-write article-Acc this the-evening-Acc
       'I will be writing an article this evening.'

    c. lan ?uṣāḥibaka   ?ilā l-masraḥi   hāḏā l-masā?a
       Neg 1Sg-accompany-2Sg to   the-theatre-Gen this evening-Acc
       'I will not accompany you to the theatre this evening.'

In order to 'calculate' the movement from the literal to the non-literal act (in other words, the movement from (8b) to (8c), for example), Searle proposes a system of inferences, based on the theory of speech acts, the maxims of Grice, and the informational background of the speaker and the hearer. This inferential system allows the hearer, proceeding by stages, to infer the non-literal act of an utterance (which constitutes the principle aim of the speaker), from the literal act.

2. The notion of illocutionary force in linguistics.

2.1. The propositions.

The notion illocutionary force (or speech act) was introduced into linguistics (together with other pragmatic notions of philosophic origin such as those of presupposition, reference, etc.), by the movement within Generative Semantics which for this reason has come to be called 'Pragmantax'. The essence of the arguments put forward by the adherents of Pragmantax in favour of the integration of the notion 'illocutionary force' into grammar (Ross 1970, Sadock 1975), rests on the fact that a large number of grammatical processes (coordination, the occurrence of certain morphemes, the application of certain transformations) may only be adequately described within the framework of a grammar where this notion is represented.

Whereas in the other models proposed within the framework of transformational generative grammar the type of sentence (imperative, interrogative, declarative) is found indicated by a morphemic constituent (I, Q, Wh) generated in the base as a sister of the sentence node, adherents of Generative Semantics adopt, in order to represent the illocutionary force of the phrase, what has come to be called the Performative Hypothesis (hereafter PH). According to the PH, the illocutionary force of the sentence is represented at

the level of underlying structure in the form of a matrix sentence', whose verb is one of a group of performative verbs (such as *to tell, to ask, to promise*), governing the lower sentence that gives the propositional content.

As regards FG, the only concrete proposal made within this framework with the aim of representing the illocutionary force associated with linguistic utterances is that of De Jong (1980). The detailed examination of De Jong's proposal, together with those of the adherents of the PH, will be the subject of the following section.

## 2.2. An examination of the two proposals.

2.2.1. The performative hypothesis.

As we have indicated above, the underlying structure of the sentence is regarded, within the framework of the PH, as being a complex sentence made up of a matrix clause representing the illocutionary force, and an embedded sentence that represents the propositional content. The general form of the underlying structure may thus be represented in the following manner:

(9)

As (9) demonstrates, the underlying structure is seen as a predicative structure made up of a predicate and three arguments. The predicate is one of the verbs known as performatives (*to say, to ask, to promise, etc.*), the two arguments 1 and 2 refer to the speaker and the hearer respectively, while argument 3 consists of the sentence that carries the propositional content. In this way, for example, the underlying structure of (10) is something like (11):

(10)   ?aᶜiduka   ?annanī   sa?usāᶜiduka
        1Sg-promise-2Sg that-1Sg-Acc Fut-1Sg-help-2Sg
        'I promise to help you.'

5

(11)

```
                              S₁
         ┌──────────┬─────────┼──────────┐
       PRED       Arg-1     Arg-2      Arg-3
         │          │         │          │
       waᶜada      ?ana      ?anta       S₂
       promise      I        you        ╱╲
                                       ╱──╲
                                  sa?usāᶜiduka
                                  I will help you
```

This type of structure is postulated for all sentences, whether they are
explicit or implicit performatives. In other words a sentence not containing a
performative verb at surface structure receives, according to the PH, a matrix
clause in deep structure. Therefore the deep structure of (12) is (13):

(12)   Zaydun   marīḍun
        Zayd-Nom ill-Nom
        'Zayd is ill.'

(13)

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                              S₁
         ┌──────────┬─────────┼──────────┐
       PRED       Arg-1     Arg-2      Arg-3
         │          │         │          │
        qala       ?ana      ?anta       S₂
        say         I        you        ╱╲
                                       ╱──╲
                                  Zaydun maridun
                                  Zayd is ill
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In order to account for the non-appearance of the performative verb and the
arguments referring to the speaker and the hearer in linguistic expressions
of type (12), a deletion rule is postulated which deletes the entire matrix
clause.[2]

Concerning utterances bearing on implicature (i.e. utterances with which is
associated an illocutionary force other than that corresponding to their
syntactic surface structure), there has been some debate within the framework
of PH, over the problem of knowing which illocutionary force to represent in
deep structure: the 'literal' illocutionary force, the contextual illocutionary
force, or both at the same time.

Two proposals have been made on this subject, that of Gordon and Lakoff (1975) and that of Sadock (1975). Gordon and Lakoff propose that only the literal illocutionary force be represented in deep structure, and the 'calculation' of the contextual (or conversationally implied) illocutionary force on the basis of the first, by means of rules known as 'conversational postulates'. According to Sadock the two illocutionary forces, literal and contextual, both of which determine the formal properties of the sentence, must both be represented in deep structure. This is seen as the conjunction of two S-nodes, one of which represents the literal, and the other the contextual (or implied) illocutionary force. The general form of the deep structure is something like (14):

(14)

Thus, to take an example, the deep structure of (6a), understood as conversationally implying a request, would be something like (15):

(15)

7

From this résumé of the propositions made within the framework of the PH we are left with the following essential points:

(i) The illocutionary force of a sentence is represented at the level of deep structure.

(ii) It is represented in the form of a matrix clause including a performative verb and two constituents referring to the hearer and the speaker.

(iii) In the case of sentences involving implicature the two illocutionary forces, literal and contextual, may be equally represented at the level of deep structure.

2.2.2. De Jong's proposal

Before summarising De Jong's proposal regarding the representation of the illocutionary force in grammar as it is envisioned in the theory of FG we consider it useful to recall the essence of its organisation. In FG the sentence is derived by the construction of three structures: predicative, functional, and constituent structure. The three structures are built up by means of the application of three sets of rules: the fund and the term insertion rules, syntactic assignment rules and expression rules. The latter contain essentially the case assignment rules and the accent and intonation assignment rules. The output of the application of the expression rules serves as the pre-phonological representation of the sentence.

We note in passing (we will return to it later) that the grammar as it is envisioned in FG tends to be a psychologically real grammar. For this reason it contains as few transformations as possible.

Let us take (16) as illustration:

(16)   qābala Zaydun   ᶜAmran
        3Sg-met Zayd-Nom Amr-Acc
        'Zayd met Amr.'

The underlying predication of (16), built up by the application of the term insertion rules to the predicate frame furnished by the rules of the fund, is (17):

(17)   Past qābala$_V$ (dx$_i$:Zayd$_{pN}$(x$_i$))$_{Ag}$ (dx$_j$:ᶜAmr$_{pN}$(x$_j$))$_{Go}$

where 'Past' indicates the temporal predicate operator, and 'Ag' and 'Go' the semantic funtions Agent and Goal associated with the arguments of the predicate.

The syntactic and pragmatic function assignment rules assign, according to certain conditions, the functions Subject and Topic to the first argument and Object and Focus to the second argument, resulting in the following predication:

(18)   Past qābala$_V$ (dx$_i$:Zayd$_{pN}$(x$_i$))$_{AgSubjTop}$ (dx$_j$:^{c}Amr$_{pN}$(x$_j$))$_{GoObjFoc}$

(18) serves as input of the first series of expression rules, the rules of case assignment which assign to the two arguments, by virtue of their syntactic functions, the abstract cases Nominative and Accusative, which results (informally) in (19):

(19)   Past qābala$_V$ (dx$_i$:Zayd$_{pN}$(x$_i$))$_{AgSubjTop}$ (dx$_j$:^{c}Amr$_{pN}$(x$_j$))$_{GoObjFoc}$
                                        Nom   Acc

The placement rules assign the two constituents *Zayd* and *^{c}Amr* to the positions S and O by virtue of functional structure (20), postulated to take account of the order of constituents in the Arabic sentence:

(20)   P4, P2, P1, P0 V S O X, P3.

The accent and intonation assignment rules produce the construction of the constituent structure which will finally be realised as (16).

De Jong's proposal is based on the connection between the notion 'new information' (or Focus) and the notion illocutionary act. In the case of declarative sentences De Jong remarks that the asserted part corresponds with the part that carries the new information. Thus, in (22), considered as a response to (21), De Jong asserts that the informational part is the same as that which constitutes the new or focussed information.

(21)   Who opened the door?
(22)   John opened the door

With respect to the scope of the illocutionary act operator 'Ass' De Jong proposes the distinction between an assertion that contains the whole

predication and an assertion that contains only a part of the predication. In the first case the whole predication is in the scope of the operator, while in the second case a minor predication (i.e. part of the predication, an argument). In (24) for example, considered as a response to (23), the whole predication is asserted:

(23)   What did John do?
(24)   He left

De Jong proposes the representation of the illocutionary force associated with a sentence, at the level of predication, as a predication operator. Given this hypothesis two possibilities are considered. The first provides for two sorts of predication operators, one attached to the main predication (i.e. in the case that the illocutionary force bears on the whole predication), the other attached to a minor predication (i.e. in the case that it bears on only one of the terms of the predication). In the latter case De Jong suggests (25) as the underlying predication of (22):

(25) $\text{open}_V \ (x_1: \text{Ass John}_{pN}(x_1))_{\text{AgSubj}} \ (x_j: \text{door}_N(x_j))_{\text{GoObj}}$

The second possibility suggested by De Jong involves providing a single predication operator attached to the entire predication, the scope of the assertion (or the question in interrogative sentences) being determined by the Focus function. In this view the underlying predication of (22) may be represented as follows:

(26) $\text{Ass open}_V \ (x_1: \ \text{John}_{pN}(x_1)_{\text{Foc}})_{\text{AgSubj}} \ (x_j: \text{door}_N(x_j))_{\text{GoObj}}$

De Jong opts for the first solution. The essence of the argument is that the first option not only makes it possible to distinguish between assertive and interrogative sentences but it also enables one of the pragmatic functions, Focus, to be dispensed with.

3. Towards a solution of the problem

An adequate representation of illocutionary force in FG must fulfil two essential requirements. Firstly it must take account not only of the literal

illocutionary force of the sentence, but also of the illocutionary force which is associated with it contextually (i.e. the implied illocutionary force). Secondly it must be compatible with the methodological principles of FG and the organisation of grammar envisaged within it. We will keep these two requirements as criteria for evaluating both the preceding solutions and the solution we provide ourselves.

The solution adopted within the PH has the advantage of allowing the representation of the two illocutionary forces associated with the sentence; the literal and the implied illocutionary force. It allows us in this way to take account, on the hand hand, of the semantic interpretation of the sentence in a more complete way, and on the other, of the structural properties determined not only by the literal but also by the implied illocutionary force (i.e. the occurrence of certain morphemes, coordination, etc.).

On the other hand the same solution suffers from being non-realistic. It postulates, as we have indicated above, the existence of a performative sentence at deep structure level of all sentences. This requires the deletion of this performative sentence where it does not appear in surface structure. For this reason the performative solution may not be incorporated into FG, which includes no tranformational rules.

However, in the solution which we propose we will keep the idea of representing the illocutionary force in the form of a performative sentence in those cases where it appears on the surface, and of adapting it to the organisation of the grammar of FG.

De Jong's proposed solution presents the essential advantage of being compatible with the methodological principles of FG. It permits us, within this framework, to take account of literal illocutionary force of sentences by its scope and its interactions with certain pragmatic functions. However, it may not be adopted as it stands. One major deficiency is that it allows us to take account only of the literal but not of the contextually implied illocutionary force. For this reason it enables us to take account only partially of semantic interpretations. Thus for example (27), repeated here for convenience, could only receive, according to De Jong's solution, the semantic interpretation of a question:

(27)   hal turīdu šāyan
         Q   2Sg-want tea-Acc
         'Do you want tea?'

It would have, according to this solution, the following underlying predication:

(28)   Q (Pres ?arāda$_V$ (dx$_i$:2p(x$_i$))$_{AgSubjTop}$ (x$_j$:šāy$_N$(x$_j$))$_{GoObj}$)$_{Foc}$

where the illocutionary force of 'Question' is represented by the predication operator 'Q'.

Now, we know that (27) may have, contextually, the illocutionary force of an offer. By not taking the contextually implied illocutionary force into consideration this solution does not allow us, either, to take account of the formal properties which may only be described in reference to it. Thus, to take some examples, the coordination of the two propositions in (29), the occurrence of the morpheme *min* 'from', in (30) and the falling intonation (31) may only be explained by the fact that in (29) the illocutionary force implied by the first proposition is an assertion, that (30) implies contextually a denial and that the illocutionary force implied by (31) is a reproach.

(29)   ?a lam ?uᶜṭika   l-māla   wa wahabtuka   d-dāra
         Q Neg 1Sg-gave-2SG the-money-Acc and 1Sg-presented-2Sg the-house
         'Did I not give you the money and present you with the house?'
         'I gave you the money and presented you with the house.'

(30)   hal min šafīᶜin
         Q from an-intercessor-Gen
         'Is there an intercessor?'
         'There isn't an intercessor.'

(31)   ?a Ḫālidan   talṭimu
         Q Halid-Acc 2Sg-slap in the face
         'Are you slapping Halid's face?
         'You should not slap Halid's face.'

Other examples of formal properties determined by the implied illocutionary force are given in the literature produced in the area of the PH, to which we recommend the reader.

A second important deficiency in De Jong's proposal is that he does not discuss the case of complex sentences where the main clause is a performative of type (32)

(32)   I assert that I have seen Paul.

In sentences of this type the illocutionary force is indicated by the same verb as that in the main clause, which renders superfluous the representation of this same illocutionary force by a predication operator. The illocutionary force of assertion associated with (32) being expressed by the verb *assert*,

its representation by means of the predication operator 'Ass' would be purely and simply redundant.

A third problem is that De Jong, as we have seen above, proposes two predication operators, a main predication operator and a minor predication operator, whose rôle is to indicate the scope of the illocutionary function. This proposal is only valid in those cases where the phrase has a single illocutionary force, the literal illocutionary force. In other cases, the illocutionary force associated with the whole of the predication (i.e. the main predication in De Jong's terminology) may be different from the illocutionary force associated with one of the terms (i.e. minor predication). Let us consider, for example, (33):

(33)   ?aina l-faḍīlatu
         where the-virtue-Nom
         'Where is (the) virtue?'
         'There is no virtue.'

The illocutionary force associated contextually with (33) is that of a denial (i.e. virtue does not exist), just as that associated with *?aina* 'where' is that of question.

It is clear from this that one may not assimilate the illocutionary force of a predication in 'partial' interrogative sentences (i.e. question and Q) into that of the questioned term and content oneself in consequence with indicating it by means of the operator Q attached to this term, as De Jong proposes. This observation may be generalised to all types of sentences.

Finally, one of the arguments that De Jong provides in favour of the solution he proposes is that it allows one to dispense with the Focus function, the focussed constituent being, according to this solution, the one to which the minor predication operators are attached - 'Ass' in assertive and 'Q' in interrogative sentences.

Nevertheless, this is only true for sentences where the focussed constituent carries the new information asserted (in declarative sentences) or asked (in interrogative sentences). In interrogative sentences with which an implied illocutionary force other than that of Question is associated, the focussed constituent does not carry new information. In (34), for example, with which the illocutionary force Reproach is associated by implication, the constituent *Hindan* is focussed (i.e. designates the most salient information), but it does not carry the new information requested since the speaker already possesses it:

(34)   ?a Hindan   tassubbu
       Q Hind-Acc 2Sg-insult
       'Are you insulting Hind?'
       'You should not insult Hind.'

Since it does not have this property, the constituent *Hindan* may not be seen
as the term 'questioned' in (34), that is to say the term to which one may
attach, according to De Jong's proposed solution, the minor predication
operator 'Q'. It is, however, the focussed constituent. It is not therefore
possible to dispense with the Focus function as De Jong proposes.

The solution we ourselves propose to take account of the illocutionary force
of sentences within the framework of FG rests on the following principles. The
two illocutionary forces associated with the sentence (i.e. the literal and the
implied illocutionary force), must be represented in the grammar. Complex
sentences containing an overt performative sentence (i.e. a sentence with a
performative verb in the present indicative and a first person subject phrase),
must be distinguished from sentences which do not. In other words, explicit
performative sentences must be distinguished from implicit performative
sentences. In the case of complex sentences containing a performative clause
(in the sense outlined above), the illocutionary force is indicated by the
clause itself. In other cases the illocutionary force is indicated by a
predication operator attached to the whole predication.

Proceeding from the above principles we propose the representation of the
illocutionary force associated with the sentences of natural languages in the
following way. The illocutionary force associated with complex sentences
containing a performative clause is represented by the performative clause
itself. Thus the underlying predications of (35) and (36) may be represented
as in (37) and (38), respectively:

(35)   ?a^{c}iduka   ?annanī   sa?ātī
       1Sg-promise 1-Sg-that 1Sg-Fut-come
       'I promise that I will come.'

(36)   I ask you if Paul has come.

(37)   Pres wa^{c}ada$_V$ $(dx_i:1p(x_i))_{AgSubj}$ $(dx_j:2p(x_j))_{RecObjTop}$

          $(x_k:[Fut\ ?atā_V\ (dx_l:1p(x_l))_{AgSubj}]\ (x_k))_{GoFoc}$

(38)   Pres ask$_V$ $(dx_i:1p(x_i))_{AgSubj}$ $(dx_j:2p(x_j))_{RecObjTop}$

          $(x_k:[Q\ Neg\ come_V\ (dx_l:Paul_{pN}(x_l))_{AgSubj}]\ (x_k))_{GoFoc}$

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Since the illocutionary force in sentences (35) and (36) is represented by the main predication, the indication of this illocutionary force by a predication operator becomes superfluous.

We propose that the illocutionary force associated with sentences lacking an overt performative be represented by a predication operator attached to the predication. The predication operator represents either the literal or the implied illocutionary force of the sentences or both the literal and the implied illocutionary forces. Proceeding from this principle, the underlying predications of (39) and (40) are represented in (41) and (42), respectively:

(39) hal ḥaraja   Zaydun
      Q   3Sg-left Zayd-Nom
      'Has Zayd left?'

(40) hal tusāᶜidunī
      Q   2Sg-help-1Sg-Acc
      'Do you help me?'
      'Help me!'

(41) Q {Past ḥaraja$_V$ (x$_i$:Zayd$_{pN}$(x$_i$))$_{AgSubjTop}$}$_{Foc}$

(42) Q + Req {Fut sāᶜada$_V$ (x$_i$:2p(x$_i$))$_{AgSubj}$ (x$_j$:1p(x$_j$))$_{GoObjTop}$}$_{Foc}$

In (41) and (42) the predication operators 'Q' and 'Req' represent respectively the illocutionary forces question and request. The operator 'Q', indicating the literal illocutionary force of (39) and (40) will be expressed at the level of their constituent structures by the clause operator *hal* (the interrogative particle), which will be inserted at the head of the predication by an expression rule.[3]

The same analysis holds good for complex sentences like (43), whose underlying predication is (44), where the main clause is not a performative:

(43) sa?altuka   hal ᶜāda   ᶜAmrun
      1Sg-asked-2Sg Q   3Sg-returned Amr-Nom
      'I asked you if Amr had returned.'

(44) Ass{Past sa?ala$_V$ (dx$_1$:1p(x$_1$))$_{AgSubj}$ (dx$_j$:2p(x$_j$))$_{RecObjTop}$
            (x$_k$:[Q ᶜāda$_V$ (dx$_1$:ᶜAmr$_{pN}$(x$_1$))$_{AgSubj}$] (x$_k$)$_{Go}$)}$_{Foc}$

The main clause in (43) is not a performative, the verb *sa?ala* 'ask' being in the past tense. Consequently (43) receives the same treatment as a simple

sentence: a predication operator must be postulated in it to represent its associated (literal or implied) illocutionary force.

The rôle of the two predication operators indicating the literal and the implied illocutionary forces is to account for the semantic interpretation of the sentence. At the same time they account for the formal properties (i.e. the occurrence of clause operators, coordination, the occurrence of certain morphemes) and the intonation of the sentence. In other words, certain expression rules (i.e. those whose function it is to build up the constituent structure) such as the insertion rule for clause operators and the rule for the assignment of intonation, are sensitive to both the illocutionary forces, represented at the level of underlying predication by the two predication operators in question.

The remaining point to be cleared up regarding the representation of the illocutionary force is that of calculating the contextually implied illocutionary force. Regarding this point we propose incorporating into FG, at the level of the illocutionary force of the sentence, the conditions proposed by Searle (1969) to account for the accomplishment of speech acts. Thus FG contains two types of contextual conditions: conditions relating to the assignment of pragmatic functions (i.e. Topic, Focus, etc.), and conditions realting to the illocutionary force associated with the predication. Proceeding from the conditions on the accomplishment of speech acts proposed by Searl, we may propose the following generalisation with the aim of calculating the implicature (i.e. the passage of the literal to the implied illocutionary force):[4]

(45)   Given the conditions C_1, C_2, ..., C_n relating to the literal illocutionary force 'F', an utterance 'E' may imply contextually the illocutionary force 'F_1' by the violation of one of the conditions C_1, ..., C_n. The illocutionary force F_1 is that of which one condition is the condition 'non-C'.

The generalisation in (45) allows us to account for the phenomenon of implicature adequately while at the same time answering two essential questions: when an utterance 'E' has the literal illocutionary force 'F', does it imply another illocutionary force contextually; and what precisely is the illocutionary force implied contextually by the utterance 'E'? Let us consider, for example, sentence (34), repeated here for convenience.

(34)   ?a Híndan tasubbu
         'Are you insulting Hind?'

The literal illocutionary force associated with (34) is, like that of the interrogative particle *?a*, that of a question. Now one of the conditions relating to the illocutionary force of question (i.e. the ignorance on the part of the speaker about that which he wants to inform himself about) is violated in (34). Because of this fact, (34) carries contextually the illocutionary force reproach, one of whose conditions is the opposite of the condition of ignorance (i.e. the speaker knows the answer to what he is asking). Thus, two illocutionary forces are associated with (34): a literal illocutionary force (question), and a contextually implied illocutionary force (reproach), as is indicated by the two predication operators 'Q' and 'Rep' in (46):

(46)   Q+Rep {Pres sabba$_V$ (dx$_i$:2p(x$_i$))$_{AgSubjTop}$ (dx$_j$:Zayd$_{pN}$(x$_j$))$_{GoObjFoc}$}

Notes.

1. Recall that the maxim of relevance is formulated by Grice as follows: "be relevant".

2. This rule was formulated by Ross (1970) as follows:

	NP	V	NP	P
	1	2	3	4
opt ⇒				4

3. Dik (1983) suggests that relators (prepositions, complementisers) should be inserted into the functional structure by expression rules.

4. This generalisation is based on the idea that the conditions on the accomplishments of speech acts could form a single system of oppostions in which each condition C is opposed by a condition non-C.

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